Cost pass-through in strategic oligopoly : sectoral evidence for the EU ETS by Alexeeva-Talebi, Victoria
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-056
Cost Pass-Through in 
Strategic Oligopoly: 
Sectoral Evidence for the EU ETS
Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-056
Cost Pass-Through in 
Strategic Oligopoly: 
Sectoral Evidence for the EU ETS
Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10056.pdf
Non-technical summary 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the cost pass-through potential, i.e. the ability of firms 
in German industrial sectors participating in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) to 
adjust output prices to input cost shocks. The analysis is as comprehensive as the data permits 
and covers industrial branches paper and pulp, chemicals, rubber and plastic and non-metallic 
minerals. Although strategic interactions of domestic energy-intensive sectors with foreign 
competitors might be of importance, empirical cost pass-through literature does typically not 
take them into consideration. The stylised theoretical and empirical framework in this paper 
employs therefore a variant of the mark-up model of price determination which allows for 
strategic interactions between domestic and foreign firms. The key feature of the model is that 
the cost pass-through of domestic firms is limited by strategic considerations. The empirical 
section demonstrates that strategic pricing in the presence of the incomplete cost pass-through 
is by far the prevailing behaviour of German sectors within the EU ETS. We find that high 
market power of domestic firms in relatively homogenous product markets leads to lower cost 
pass-through rates and to the more pronounced adjustment towards the foreign producers’ 
prices. The higher the market concentration of domestic firms in more heterogeneous product 
markets, the higher the cost pass-through potential and the lower strategic interactions with 
foreign enterprises.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht das Kostenüberwälzungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen 
(d.h. die Anpassung der Outputpreise an die Inputpreisveränderungen), welche am EU- 
Emissionshandel (EU EHS) teilnehmen. Die Analyse ist so umfassend wie die vorhandenen 
Daten für Deutschland es erlauben und betrachtet die Industriezweige Papier und Zellstoff, 
Chemie, Gummi und Kunststoff sowie die nicht-metallischen Mineralstoffe. Obwohl 
strategische Interaktionen von inländischen energieintensiven Sektoren mit ausländischen 
Wettbewerbern relevant sind, werden diese typischerweise von der empirischen Literatur zur 
Kostenweitergabe nicht berücksichtigt. Der stilisierte theoretische und empirische Rahmen 
des Papiers wendet daher eine Variante des Mark-up-Modells zur Preisbestimmung in 
strategischen Oligopolen an, wobei die strategischen Interaktionen zwischen inländischen und 
ausländischen Firmen das Kostenüberwälzungsverhalten deutscher Produzenten einschränkt. 
Der empirische Teil zeigt auf, dass die Mehrheit der deutschen Produzenten mit den 
ausländischen Wettbewerbern interagiert und somit eine unvollständige Kostenüberwälzung 
aufweist. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass hohe Marktmacht bei heimischen Produzenten auf 
relativ homogenen Produktmärkten zu geringeren Kostenüberwälzungsraten und einer 
stärkeren Ausrichtung auf die ausländischen Preise führt. Hingegen gilt: Je höher die 
Marktmacht bei heimischen Produzenten auf relativ heterogenen Produktmärkten ist, umso 
höher sind die Kostenüberwälzungsraten und umso weniger relevant sind die strategischen 
Interaktionen mit der ausländischen Konkurrenz. 
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(decreasing) market shares and profit margins. Using advanced time-series techniques, this 
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Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The relatively low cost pass-through rates in the long-run 
in most sectors in our sample – in comparison to studies which do not account for strategic 
interactions – are consistent with earlier findings. Additional costs induced by the EU ETS are 
therefore likely to be absorbed through a reduction of profit margin, creating incentives to 
relocate business abroad. Policy implications of the results are that strategic interactions 
between domestic and foreign firms could be a critical factor in applying offsetting 
instruments to address carbon leakage domestically. Accounting for oligopolistic structures – 
with and without strategic interactions – should therefore be a central issue within the broader 
context of how market structure affects climate change policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate policy in Europe has been increasingly designed to encourage energy-intensive 
companies to pursue low-carbon strategies in production process. The revised emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) in the EU foresees tightening emissions cap and introducing auctions as 
the basic principle for allocation of carbon allowances beyond 2012, with an auction rate of 
up to 100% in the power sector (EU 2008).  
In the world with uneven carbon constraints, commitments to ambitious emissions targets 
give rise to multiple concerns, including the potentially adverse impact on competitiveness of 
European enterprises and the global environmental effectiveness. In the run-up to final 
consultations at the highest level in Brussels, heavy industry – in particular cement, steel, 
aluminium and chemical sectors – argued that the revised scheme would force them to move 
factories and jobs out of the EU's borders, leading to a 'leakage' of carbon emissions. Such 
concerns have been particularly extensive in Germany, the biggest player in the EU ETS 
(EurActive 2009). 
Successful lobbying for preferential treatment of sectors potentially exposed to a significant 
risk of carbon leakage established the final compromise: EU leaders agreed that eligible 
sectors will be granted 100% of benchmarked emissions allowances free of charge after 2012. 
In following up this decision, the European Commission (EC) defined a rather simplified 
catalogue of exposure criteria and ascertained that 146 out of 258 sectors at the NACE 4-digit 
level have been meeting these criteria (EU 2009). The results in this paper cast some doubt on 
the usefulness of such a generous provision of benchmarked emissions allowances free of 
charge to energy-intensive sectors.  
Given the importance of carbon leakage issues in current EU climate change policy, 
comprehensive research work has emerged over recent years. Assumptions on cost pass-
through relationships determine the impact of asymmetric climate change policy on two 
channels of carbon leakage: (decreasing) market shares and profit margins. Numerical studies 
within a general equilibrium framework have focused on assessing carbon leakage and 
competitiveness effects associated with the implementation of the EU ETS (Böhringer and 
Lange 2005, Peterson 2006, Alexeeva-Talebi and Anger 2007). Assuming that an increase in 
marginal carbon costs is fully borne by consumers of the final good and consequently profit 
margins of producers remain unchanged, these studies quantify how domestic suppliers adjust 
market shares in both domestic and foreign markets. Cost increases are, however, not 
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necessarily fully passed to consumers of energy-intensive goods through price increase but 
can be absorbed by the industry through a reduction of profit margins. In an extreme case, this 
might imply constant prices and sustaining output level but decreasing profit margins 
(Hourcade et al. 2007). Between both extremes, asymmetric climate change policy creates 
incentives to relocate business abroad by affecting both market shares and profit margins. 
Assuming a range of cost pass-through rates, i.e. shares of an increase in marginal costs that 
are passed on to output prices, global sectoral models quantify the impact of stringent 
environmental policies on both market shares and profit margins (Demailly and Quirion 2006, 
2008, Smale et al. 2006). As a prominent example, Demailly and Quirion (2008) conduct a 
simulation analysis for the iron and steel sector. The authors conclude that pass-through rates 
are of major importance: Results related to competitiveness and carbon leakage crucially 
depend on the ability of the sector to pass-through additional costs to consumers. 
Empirical evidence on cost pass-through relationships in sectors that are of special interest 
within the current EU climate change policy is rather scarce. Few studies analyse the scope 
and speed of output price adjustments in the event of input price shocks: Sijm (2005, 2006a, 
2006b) and Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008) estimate the potential to pass-through 
additional carbon costs in the power generation sector. Walker (2006) conducts a comparable 
study for the European cement sector. Controlling for labour costs, Gerald et al. (2009) 
estimate cost pass-through rates for European energy-intensive sectors at the relatively low 
level of sectoral disaggregation. More recently, Oberndorfer et al. (2010) analyse cost pass-
through relationships in selected energy-intensive sectors in the UK. The other branch of 
literature focuses on determinants of the cost pass-through such as demand, trade and 
substitution elasticities. Welsch (2008) provided evidence for low substitution elasticities 
among imports and competing domestic goods (Armington elasticities) for few energy-
intensive sectors in four European countries. Finally, some empirical evidence can be found 
in studies focusing on the ability of the EU exporters to pass-through exchange rate shocks 
into the foreign consumer prices (for German exporters: Knetter 1993, Clostermann 1996, 
Goldberg and Knetter 1997, Stahn 2006 and Gaulier et al. 2008). 
This paper evaluates the exposure of German energy-intensive sectors to the risk of carbon 
leakage by estimating the long-run pass-through potential. It analyses the extent and the 
differences of cost pass-through rates across German energy-intensive sectors covered by the 
EU ETS. The empirical section employs a simple mark-up model of imperfect international 
competition (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Dornbusch 1987). The key feature of the estimated 
model is that each domestic firm’s price depends on its labour, material and energy costs and 
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its flexible mark-up which is in turn determined by industry characteristics and the price 
charged by foreign competitors. Strategic interactions between domestic and foreign firms 
limit thereby the impact of domestic cost shocks on price competitiveness on the part of large 
imperfectly competitive firms. Although strategic interactions in energy-intensive sectors 
might be very relevant, empirical literature on the cost pass-through does not typically take 
them into account (Gerald et al. 2009).  
Our analysis is as comprehensive as the data permits and covers sub-sectors in German 
industrial branches paper and pulp, chemicals, rubber and plastic and non-metallic minerals. 
Using data at the high level of sectoral disaggregation (3- and 4-digit-level), the analysis 
overcomes the problem of high order aggregation which traditionally plagues empirical cost 
pass-through literature. 
The regional focus is mainly motivated by two considerations: First, Germany represents the 
biggest emitter in the EU ETS and German energy-intensive sectors are expected to benefit 
most from preferential treatment in the third trading period beyond 2012. Second, it is 
plausible to apply the framework of strategic oligopoly to German energy-intensive sectors. 
Most importantly, German sectors participating in the EU ETS are typically dominated by 
few big companies (e.g. BASF, HeidelbergCement). According to the variant of the mark-up 
model applied in this paper, the existence of large companies is essential for strategic 
interactions to occur. All sectors in our sample, with only one exception, are equipped with 
the market power which lies above the median value in Germany.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the climate change policy twofold: First, it 
evaluates the risk of carbon leakage in German energy-intensive sectors using advanced time-
series techniques. The results of the estimation procedure yield estimates of cost pass-through 
rates in the long-run equilibrium varying across industries, from 0% to 75%. The less-than-
complete pass-through implies that additional costs induced by the EU ETS are likely to be 
partly absorbed through a reduction of profit margins, but the severe risk of carbon leakage 
exists in few sectors only. It is mainly concentrated in parts of the paper industry and the 
chemical production, in which long-run pass-through elasticities range between roughly 0% 
and 15%. Sectors with medium to high cost pass-through rates might still be forced to move 
factories out of the EU's borders through the (decreasing) market share channel, but severe 
implications on profit margins are rather unlikely. Second, it explains the variation in pass-
through across energy-intensive sub-sectors by industry characteristics and the price charged 
by foreign competitors. The analysis finds a significant role for included industrial 
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characteristics like market power and product substitutability, but the impact on the pass-
through is ultimately determined by the interplay of individual effects working in different 
directions. More importantly, most of the German EU ETS sectors have a flexible mark-up, 
which is outcome of strategic interactions between domestic and foreign firms. The higher the 
interaction with foreign producers is, the lower the pass-through potential of domestic firms. 
We conclude by emphasising that strategic interactions between German and foreign firms 
could be an additional critical factor for the design of appropriate countermeasures to 
delimitate carbon leakage in the EU. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework 
underpinning the model estimated in section 3. Section 4 presents and analyses the results. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. Theory of the cost pass-through in strategic oligopoly 
To analyse the potential passing-through capacity of additional costs in German energy-
intensive sectors, we employ a variant of the mark-up model of price determination built upon 
the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Dornbusch (1987)1. Under the condition of 
imperfect competition in heterogeneous goods, this framework allows for strategic interaction 
between domestic and foreign firms. The key element of the model is that firms are in 
position to charge a flexible mark-up over marginal costs.  
Assume that representative consumer maximises the following sub-utility function of the CES 
(constant elasticity of substitution) type: 
  1(1 )      d fU a X a X       (1) 
where 
1
1
    
Dn s
s
d di
i
X x  is a bundle of different brands dix  of the domestically produced 
commodity and  
1
1
    
Fn t
t
f fj
j
X x  is an index of different varieties fjx  of the same commodity 
produced abroad. It is assumed that there are Dn  domestic firms and Fn foreign firms in (our) 
                                                 
1 Dornbusch (1987) considers the Dixit-Stiglitz model (1977) to capture the effects of imperfect competition and 
product differentiation on the output price responses to exchange rate changes. Thereafter, we do not take 
exchange rate changes into consideration. 
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home market supplying some variant (brand) each. a  is the share parameter ( 0 1 a ),   is 
the outer substitution parameter defined by the elasticity of substitution,  , as  1    
with 1 0    (and hence 1 ). To focus on the substitution between domestic and 
foreign bundles only, we assume   s t   (see also Strauß 2004).  
The profit maximisation yields the following demand for each individual domestic and 
foreign variant:  
    
di
di
px a X
P

   (2)  (1 )
     
fj
fj
p
x a X
P

  (3) 
     
with  
1
1
1 1
1 1
(1 )

 
 
      
D Fn n
di fj
i j
P a p a p

        (4) 
as an index of all varieties’ prices (industry price),  while dip  and fjp  denote the prices of 
domestically produced and imported variants, respectively. Individual (domestic and foreign) 
firms face demand curve as in (2) and (3), where each firm’s market share dix
X
 (with X  as 
total demand) depends on its product price relative to the industry price dip
P
 and fj
p
P
, 
respectively.  
The profits of the domestic firm k  which is identical to other 1Dn  domestic firms but not to 
Fn  foreign firms is given by:2 
  dk dk dk dkp c x      (5) 
where dkx  is the output quantity and dkc  are the unit costs of the domestic firm. 
Under conditions of imperfect competition, assume now that individual firms are large 
enough to affect the industry price P , while strategic interactions between firms are 
introduced by means of a conjectural variation   ( 0 1  ). The latter parameter indicates 
                                                 
2 Assume further that there is an effective separation between home and foreign markets. In doing so, it is 
possible to discuss the pricing behaviour of foreign producers in our market separately. 
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that firms respond to a one-percentage-point rise in the industry price by increasing their 
prices by   percent3. 
The first-order condition of profit maximisation for an individual domestic producer k  
becomes: 
  0                            dk dkdk dk dk dk dk
x x Px p c p P p   (6) 
Thus, a single firm’s production volume is affected directly via change in its individual price 
  dk dkx p  and indirectly via changes in the industry price index resulting from his own 
decision        dk dkx P P p . 
Let   denote the elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to the single supplier’s 
own price:  
    dk dkdP P dp p      (7) 
Since individual firm has to take into consideration the extent to which its action affects the 
industry price index P , this term captures the strategic interaction between firms as perceived 
from the domestic firm k . Using the above definition for   ( 0 1  ), the first-order 
condition can be simplified to: 
1 ( ) ( ) ( 1) 0     dk dk dkp c p      (8) 
and solved for the optimal price under strategic interaction: 
1
11
(1 )
        dk dk dk dk
p c c      (9) 
Assuming that the conjectural variation for all firms i  and j  is given by: 
   , ,di fj di fjdp p dP P   with  0 1    (10) 
one gets the following expression for the elasticity  4 if totally differentiating (4): 
                                                 
3 In the Cournot model of imperfect competition in homogenous goods (perfect substitutability between the 
domestic and imported goods), a firm’s mark-up depends on its market share. Firms with a high market share are 
considered to be able to charge higher prices (see for further details Menon 1996). But in reality, this might be 
difficult if competitors are not expected to follow a firm’s price increase.  Hence, firm’s optimal pricing strategy 
will not only depend on its market share but be conditioned by the anticipation of competitors’ reaction to this 
strategy. This interrelation is expressed as the conjectural variation. 
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1
1
(1 )(1 )
            
D F di
fj
pan n
a p



 
    (11) 
This elasticity depends thereby on relative prices, the conjectural variation, the elasticity of 
substitution among variants and the number of domestic and foreign firms. The mark-up 
pricing equation (9) and equation (11) highlights the fact that firm’s optimal price policy is no 
longer to charge a constant but rather a flexible mark-up dk  over margin costs (depending on 
the relative prices). 
From equation (9) and (11), it is obvious that domestic firm’s reaction function is given by 
( , , , , )D Fdk fj di dkp f p p n n c   . By following similar steps one gets the following reaction 
function for the foreign firm: *( , , , , )d ffj di fj fjp f p p n n c   . 
The main theoretical implication of the model developed in this section for the subsequent 
empirical investigation is that strategic interactions between domestic and foreign producers 
under the condition of imperfect competition will limit the ability of domestic producers to 
pass-through cost shocks. This can be seen from the elasticity of domestic prices calculated 
with respect to domestic costs and industry price5 from equation (9): this yields empirical 
coefficients 1  and 2  which are estimated in the subsequent section: 
1 1 (1 )[1 (1 )]
dk dk
dk dk
dp c
dc p
             (14) 
and 
2 (1 )[1 (1 )]
dk dkdp p
dP P
            (15) 
Equation (14) illustrates that the cost pass-through in strategic oligopoly is smaller than in the 
standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework where it is equal to 1. Equations (14) and (15) introduce the 
following adding-up restrictions on coefficients for domestic firm’s price equation (in 
logarithms):  
                                                                                                                                                        
4 In the Dixit-Stiglitz model (1977) this elasticity is zero. 
5 Given the fact that domestic firms are identical this basically implies that domestic firm has to take foreign 
prices into consideration.  
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1 1(1 )  dk dk fjp c p  ,  10 1     (16) 
where  1 captures the intensity of competitive pressure in the respective sector k . If 1  is 
zero, domestic prices are set exclusively with respect to the domestic producer’s cost 
situation. This reflects constant mark-up over marginal domestic costs and complete cost 
pass-through rates for domestic producers. If 1  is one, domestic prices are set exclusively 
with respect to the foreign producer’s prices. In this case, increasing costs are fully absorbed 
by the profit margin of the domestic producer. If 1  varies between zero and one, domestic 
prices react to both domestic unit costs and foreign competitors’ prices. The higher 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, the higher number of competing 
enterprises in the sector and the higher conjectural variation, the lower is the cost pass-
through potential of the domestic firm.  
In the context of the unilateral EU climate change policy, this simple framework allows 
illustrating important insights. The main options to address competitiveness-driven carbon 
leakage includes free allocation of allowances to existing and new facilities, financial 
compensation, border tax adjustments (BTAs) or the inclusion of importers into the EU ETS 
and global sectoral agreements, i.e. instruments encouraging sector-based activities in 
developing countries. Figure 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate price adjustments for two different 
policy options which play a prominent role in the current EU discourse on climate policy: the 
inclusion of importers into the emissions trading scheme and the provision of benchmarked 
emissions allowances free of charge. The curves AA and A*A* are the price reaction 
functions of domestic and foreign firms, respectively. Assume without a loss of generality, 
that B is the initial equilibrium with carbon costs being already reflected in prices of domestic 
firms. Now consider the case (Figure 1) in which home country imposes an import tariff on 
foreign products in the domestic market or includes importers into the domestic emissions 
trading scheme (see for further details Alexeeva-Talebi et al. 2008). This policy will shift the 
foreign reaction function up and to the right due to the increased costs while leaving the 
domestic reaction function unchanged. The new equilibrium B’ is characterised through 
higher domestic prices. 
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Alternatively, the government of the home country subsidises a fraction of the carbon costs 
which are reflected in the lower domestic costs (Figure 2) as it is intended by the free 
allocation provision. This policy will shift the domestic reaction function down and right 
while leaving the foreign country’s price reaction function in place. The new equilibrium is 
therefore at B’’ with lower foreign prices. From equations (2) and (3) is clear that consumers 
will react to changing prices and adjust their consumption quantities accordingly6.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 It lies outside the scope of this paper to analyse the implications of given policy measures for production 
quantities and emissions level. At the single firm level, both policy measures are expected to have different 
impacts on both profit margins and market shares.  
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3. Empirical method, data and econometric procedure 
Empirical method 
The empirical section investigates to what extent German energy-intensive sectors covered by 
the EU ETS have a flexible mark-up over marginal costs, i.e. they set prices strategically 
when facing domestic cost shocks7. This focus allows estimating cost pass-through 
relationships for various energy-intensive sectors, while explicitly taking foreign competitors’ 
prices into consideration. 
Applying the theoretical framework of strategic oligopoly to German energy-intensive sectors 
is plausible for three reasons: First, anecdotic evidence suggests that German sectors 
participating in the EU ETS are dominated by big companies (e.g. BASF, 
HeidelbergCement). According to the theory in the previous section, the existence of large 
companies is essential for strategic interactions to occur. Second, the assumption of domestic 
and foreign goods being imperfect substitutes is widely used in numerical models which 
analyse climate change policies in the context of the EU ETS (the so-called Armington 
assumption, see further Armington 1969). Third, there is sporadic evidence that German 
producers in energy-intensive sectors compete with foreign companies in prices and not in 
quantities even in relatively homogenous markets such as cement sector. 
We estimate a model that captures long-run equilibrium relationships between domestic 
producer prices, foreign producer prices and domestic costs in German energy-intensive 
sectors. More specifically, we broaden theoretical approach in previous section by assuming 
different types of input factors such as labour labtp , material 
mat
tp and electricity
ele
tp  (see 
below). The inclusion of these variables, in particular input factor material, is important to 
avoid an omission of variable problems which leads to estimating biased pass-through 
coefficients (Gross and Schmitt 2000). 
A linear combination of sectoral non-stationary variables ( domitp ,
for
itp , 
lab
itp , 
mat
itp  and 
ele
itp ) 
may thereby converge to a stationary process. The latter is referred to as a cointegration 
relationship and interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship between individual time 
series (Engle and Granger 1987). Letting itx  represent a vector of non-stationary endogenous 
                                                 
7 This is equivalent to empirically finding that  1 0  . 
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variables in the sector i ( , , , , ) dom for lab mat eleit it it it it itx p p p p p , we assume that it follows a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) process of order p: 
it i1 it 1 ip it p it itx A x ... A x By          (14) 
where ity  is a vector of exogenous variables (seasonal dummy variables), 1 pA ,...,A  are 
matrices of coefficients to be estimated and it  is a vector of innovations. This VAR model 
may be rewritten as a vector-error-correction model (VECM) for each energy-intensive sector 
as: 
p 1
it i it 1 ik it p i it it
k 1
x x x B y

 

            (15) 
where   represents the first-difference operator and i  contains information about the long-
run relationships among endogenous variables.  
iRank( ) 1   suggests the existence of a unique cointegration relationship among respective 
variables. The identification of cointegration rank(s) for each sectoral model depends on the 
form of the hypothesised cointegration equation. Johansen (1995) considers five deterministic 
trend cases. We always prefer the specification with a time trend in the cointegration equation 
over a specification with only an intercept in the cointegration equation if the time trend is 
significant:  
'
i it 1 i it i i it 1 i0 i i i0x B y ( x t)             (16) 
where i0  is an intercept in the sectoral cointegration equation, t  is a time trend in the 
cointegration equation and i0  is a deterministic term outside the cointegrating equation.  
The suggested method allows capturing not only long-run interactions among the respective 
variables, but also the short-run dynamics through the past changes in these variables. In the 
cointegration system, the sectoral error-correction term i  reflects the speed of an adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium. 
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We test the following two hypothesises:  
 Hypothesis 1: Cost pass-through rates in German energy-intensive sectors are 
incomplete in the long-run equilibrium, albeit every sector is capable to pass-through at 
least one type of cost shocks.  
 Hypothesis 2: Energy-intensive sectors in Germany have a flexible mark-up over 
domestic costs, i.e. they take foreign competitors’ prices explicitly into consideration. 
The incentives to act strategically, by taking foreign prices into consideration are higher 
in relatively homogenous product markets with high market concentration. 
 
Data 
We start our analysis with data covering fifteen industries at the 4-digit and one sector at the 
3-digit level based on the German commodity classification of production statistics (Version 
2009, GP 2009). The selection of German energy-intensive sectors participating in the EU 
ETS is based on Graichen et al. (2008).8 The analysis is as comprehensive as the data permits 
and covers sub-sectors in industrial branches including paper and pulp, chemicals, rubber and 
plastic and non-metallic minerals production. For our analysis, we use monthly data of the 
period from January 1995 to December 2008.  
Both time series for domestic ( domiP ) and foreign competitors’ prices ( foriP ) are available in 
the required sectoral breakdown for the envisaged estimation period from the German Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010a). The former is a domestic output price 
index for each product category which can be purchased in Germany; the latter measures the 
price development in the same product category imported to Germany from abroad.9 Both 
time series refer to producer prices. For convenience, we use the subscript i to refer to sectoral 
affiliation in the GP 2009 classification: For example, 1712domP  and 1712forP  are domestic and import 
prices in the sub-sector manufacture of paper and paperboard (GP09-1712), respectively. 
                                                 
8 Graichen et al. (2008) list German energy-intensive sectors which participate in the EU ETS in accordance with 
the German "classification of economic activities” (WZ). With very few exceptions, time series of sectoral 
indices down to the 4-digit level of the WZ 2008 are identical to GP 2009 and NACE Rev. 2. 
9 The appropriate price is the C.I.F. price (cost, insurance, freight) at the German border which is converted to 
Euro. 
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By plotting sectoral producer prices in Figure 310 we observe a considerable heterogeneity in 
the movement of domestic and foreign price series across the sectors. The similar course of 
both series is observable in some sectors (e.g. manufacture of fertilisers and nitrogen 
compounds), while other industrial branches can be characterised through a pronounced 
divergence of domestic and foreign competitors’ prices during the period 1995 – 2008 (e.g. 
manufacture of dyes and pigments). 
Since no price data on a more frequent basis than monthly is available for sectors of interest 
and the EU ETS is still in an early stage, the pass-through capacity of additional carbon prices 
cannot be directly estimated. Instead, we assess the potential pass-through capacity of 
domestic type of cost shocks into sectoral producer prices using price indices for labour, 
material and energy. Table 1 contains the sector-specific input shares for 1995 and 2007, 
respectively. 
Expenditures on labour and material represent a very significant fraction of the total 
production costs in all energy-intensive sectors, while energy inputs are much less important. 
Sectoral factors appear to significantly contribute to how the trend in energy intensity evolves 
over the time horizon from 1995 until 2008: The energy intensity (including electricity) 
remains roughly the same or slightly decreases in most sectors, while the production of all 
non-metallic mineral sub-sectors in Germany has become more energy-intensive over the last 
two decades. 
Sectoral labour costs are not available in the same sectoral breakdown as the domestic and 
foreign producer price indices. In our analysis we, therefore, make use of sector-specific gross 
wages at the two-digit level ( labiP ) which come from Eurostat (2010) since they are not 
available from the German Federal Statistical Office. 
We are aware of the heterogeneity in terms of production structure across the energy-intensive 
sectors. The proper identification of applicable material and energy cost indices is therefore 
an important and challenging task. To identify the best proxy for material and energy at the 
sectoral level we rely on additional data source from the German Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2009) which provides very detailed information on input factors for 
German sectors at the 2-, 3- and 4-digit level of sectoral disaggregation in the WZ2003 
classification11. Typically, the production structure includes more than a dozen material and 
                                                 
10 We plot only data which will be subsequently included into our analysis. 
11 We use concordance tables to assign the sectoral data in the WZ2003 to the GP2009 classification. 
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energy input factors, while the best proxy for the former and the latter can be identified as 
having the highest input share, respectively.12 Domestic prices from the German Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010a) are subsequently used to proxy sector-
specific material input costs ( matiP ) and energy input costs ( eleP )
13. Regarding the latter, 
electricity appears to be the most important input factor in most sub-sectors. All data series 
with the 2005 monthly average as the base value are in logarithms and seasonally unadjusted 
indexes except for the labour costs (Gross and Schmitt 2000).  
                                                 
12 In some sectors, material and energy shares are not shown for reasons of confidentiality. We then test 
alternative proxies. 
13 For example, in order to model the domestic price in the sub-sector dyes and pigments (GP09-2012) 2012
domP , we 
use the (domestic) price index for ferrous metals 27
matP  to proxy material costs and electricity prices eleP  to 
proxy energy costs since the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009) identifies both 
input factors as most important in this sub-category. 
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Figure 3: Co-movement of domestic and import prices on German markets (monthly data from January 1995 to December 2008) 
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Table 1: Labour, material and energy shares in German EU ETS sectors (% of the gross production value) in 1995 and 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010b) 
Note: German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010b) provides data for labour, material and energy shares (% of the gross production value) for 1995 
and 2007, respectively. Labour costs encompass wages for both permanently and temporally employed workers and social contributions. However, data is available at 
sectoral level in the WZ2003 classification only. Concordance tables have therefore been used to assign the sectoral data in the WZ2003 to the GP2009 classification 
which is subsequently used to estimate the cost pass-through rates. In 11 out of 16 sectors, the concordance is unique. For the remaining sectors in the GP2009 
classificatoin the following assignments have been done:  
GP2009 2013 -> WZ2003 24.13 [Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals];  GP2009 2014 -> WZ2003 24.14 [Manufacture of other basic organic chemical]; 
GP2009 2042 -> WZ2003 24.52 [Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations]; GP2009 2219-> WZ2003 25.13 [Manufacture of other rubber products]; 
GP2009 2229 -> WZ2003 25.24 [Manufacture of other plastic products]. 
Code GP 2002 Sector Labour Material Energy Labour Material Energy 
  1995 2007 
17 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products       
1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard    24.9 46.9 10.8 
1722 Manufacture of household and toilet paper and paper products 38.8 33.5 3.6 33.1 34.5 4.6 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products       
2012 Manufacture of dyes and pigments 30.9 52.8 4.8 30.7 40.3 6.4 
2013 Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals 29.9 23.4 5.5 27.1 41.6 10.4 
2015 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 26.7 39.0 16.1 33.9 28.3 6.6 
2016 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 30.0 38.1 5.1 25.7 38.2 4.2 
2042 Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations 53.3 26.6 0.6 41.7 36.6 0.7 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products       
2219 Manufacture of other rubber products 42.9 31.0 2.5 34.4 38.8 2.2 
23 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products       
2313 Manufacture of hollow glass 42.2 24.0 8.8 39.1 20.5 12.0 
2314 Manufacture of glass fibres 37.0 24.9 6.5 36.3 26.9 8.1 
2319 Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl. technical glassware 52.4 21.7 5.8 50.7 23.6 7.6 
235 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 33.4 17.7 15.9 37.0 17.7 18.5 
 17
Econometric procedure 
The first step of the econometric procedure is to test whether all price series are non-stationary: 
Unit root tests are performed following Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron 
(1988). Table 6a.-c. (Appendix) display the results of two alternative versions of the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests with and without a trend for all domestic 
and foreign producer price series enumerated in Table 1 in (logs of) levels and first differences 
over the sample period from January 1995 to December 2008. It also includes sector-specific 
material input costs, labour and energy costs. There are 43 time series in total. If a unit root 
does not exists, the time series are said to be stationary or integrated of order zero (I(0)). The 
time series are considered to be integrated of order one (I(1)) if there is a unit root but 
differencing one time makes them stationary. 
In 41 out of 43 cases, ADF and PP tests provide consistent results regarding the integration of 
order one I(1): The null hypothesis of a unit root in the (logs of) level data cannot be rejected in 
both models with and without trend at the 99% confidence level, while the null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity is rejected for each of these series after the first differencing at the 99% level. 
The variable 2229
domP  appears to be integrated of order zero I(0) according to both ADF and PP 
tests – it will be excluded from the cointegration analysis. Since the results for the remaining 
variable 20
labP  are less consistent, we additionally apply the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992). These results confirm that 20
labP  is non-stationary in 
levels but stationary in first differences at the reasonable confidence level.  
We proceed now to the second step of the econometric analysis by testing whether the linear 
combination of the respective variables is stationary. In our case there are five I(1) variables in 
each sectoral model. If so, this finding implies that there is a long-run relationship between the 
variables. Following Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), we apply trace and 
maximum eigenvalue tests to identify the number of cointegration relationships r among the 
respective variables. First, the selection of the deterministic components in the Johansen’s co-
integration analysis is important as the co-integration rank may depend on the form of the 
hypothesised co-integration equation. We, therefore, follow Johansen and Juselius (1992) by 
testing the joint hypothesis of both rank order and deterministic components and report the 
results for all deterministic trend cases (Table 8a.-c. in Appendix). Second, Stock and Watson 
(1993) show that Johansen’s analysis is sensitive to the lag lengths used in the VAR models. 
The optimal lag length obtained with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) becomes, 
however, questionable if residuals remain autocorrelated, heteroscedastic or “deviate too much 
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from Gaussian white noise” (Johansen, 1995)14. As a remedy, one may add one or more lags 
for each variable; alternatively or additionally, economically meaningful dummy variables 
(Table 7) may be needed (see further Strauß 2004, Farzanegan and Markwardt 2009). To 
minimise the effect of seasonal fluctuations, we make use of centred (orthogonalized) seasonal 
dummy variables which are factored in (Johansen 1995). 
There is strong evidence – relying on a more powerful maximum eigenvalue tests (Johansen 
and Juselius 1990) – that in 12 out of 15 sectors, domestic output prices, foreign output prices, 
wages, material and energy input costs cointegrate with at least one co-integrating vector. The 
null hypothesis that the system’s rank is zero ( r 0 ) cannot be rejected at the 5% significance 
level for the following three sectors: manufacture of abrasive products, manufacture of other 
basic organic chemicals and manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products – these sectors will 
be excluded from the further analysis. In all sectors with the system’s rank of one, the more 
encompassing model with statistically significant time trend in the cointegration equation was 
selected (Table 8a.–c. in the Appendix, column five) except for producers of paper and 
paperboard, manufacturers of other basic inorganic chemicals and processed, including 
technical glassware. In the latter case, the model with only an intercept in the cointegration 
equation was preferred due to an insignificant time trend.  
 
                                                 
14 These assumptions were clearly violated in our basis models (i.e. lag length obtained through the minimisation 
of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and no (impulse) dummy variable).  
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4. Results 
Cost pass-through estimates on labour, material and energy costs15 from Table 2a.-b. provide 
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that total cost pass-through is incomplete for all energy-
intensive sectors in the long-run equilibrium. Statistically significant cost pass-through 
coefficients outnumber by far coefficients with a wrong sign: 75% of all significant coefficients 
in the cointegration equations have the expected sign.  
Stennek and Verboven (2001) point out that the long-run pass-through elasticities need to be 
adjusted by cost share of respective input factors. Otherwise, due to low values of 
corresponding coefficients, one could falsely conclude that individual pass-through rates are 
incomplete. Therefore, based on estimated sectoral cost pass-through coefficients and sector-
specific data on input shares, we calculate the following normal distribution statistic for each 
cost pass-through coefficient (limiting to those with correct sign): 
Z (X ) / s        (17) 
where  X   is an estimated cost pass-through coefficient and s  is a standard error of the 
estimated parameter from Table 2a.-b., respectively;    refers to the corresponding input share 
from Table 1 for the year 2007. The individual cost pass-through rate is considered to be full 
(=1), if the estimated coefficient has been found not to be statistically different from the 
respective input share for a 99% confidence interval. This is the case for 83% of all long-run 
cost pass-through coefficients. The last column in Table 3 provides individual and total cost 
pass-through rates for German energy-intensive sectors. 
                                                 
15 For example, a 1% increase in wages lets the domestic producer price in the sub-sector manufacturing of dyes 
and pigments (GP09-2012) rise by 0.27%. 
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Table 2a.: Cost pass-through and strategic pricing coefficients in the long-run equilibrium  
 
Manufacture of paper and paperboard (GP09-1712) 
1712
domP  1712
forP  222matP  17labP  eleP  
-1.00 1.12  (0.09)***    
Manufacture of household and toilet paper and  paper products (GP09-1722) 
1722
domP  1722
forP  222matP  17labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.21 (0.09)*** -0.46  (0.19)*** 2.03  (0.21)*** 16 0.25 (0.03)*** 
Manufacture of dyes and pigments(GP09-2012) 
2012
domP  2012
forP  27matP  20labP  eleP  
-1.00   0.27 (0.15)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2013) 
2013
domP  2013
forP  27matP  20labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.33 (0.07)*** -0.31  (0.13)***  0.24 (0.08)*** 
Manufacture of fertilizers and  nitrogen compounds (GP09-2015) 
2015
domP  2015
forP  192matP  20labP  eleP  
-1.00 1.13 (0.10)*** - 0.23 (0.08)***  0.28 (0.06)*** 
Manufacture of plastics in primary forms (GP09-2016) 
2016
domP  2016
forP  192matP  20labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.22  (0.14)* 0.15  (0.10)*  0.10  (0.05)** 
Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations (GP09-2042) 
2042
domP  2042
forP  222matP  20labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.64 (0.22)*** -0.35 (0.23)**  -0.10 (0.02)*** 
Manufacture of other rubber products (GP09-2219) 
2219
domP  2219
forP  2017matP  22labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.47  (0.29)* 0.29  (0.08)*** 0.66  (0.27)*** 0.06 (0.04)* 
 
 
                                                 
16 The pass-through ability of labour costs in the sector manufacturing of household and toilet paper and paper 
products (GP 1722) is with 2.03% disproportionally high. This is somewhat surprising but such a high elasticity of 
input factors with respect to the output prices is occasionally found in the empirical literature. 
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Table 2b.: Cost pass-through and strategic pricing coefficients in the long-run equilibrium 
Manufacture of hollow glass (GP09-2313) 
2313
domP  2313
forP  201matP  23labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.73 (0.12)*** 0.48  (0.06)*** 0.37  (0.10)***  
Manufacture of glass fibres (GP09-2314) 
2314
domP  2314
forP  201matP  23labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.51  (0.07)*** 0.25  (0.04)***   
Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl. technical glassware (GP09-2319) 
2319
domP  2319
forP  201matP  23labP  eleP  
-1.00  0.43 (0.12)***  -0.14  (0.05)*** 
Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster (GP09-235) 
235
domP  235
forP  20matP  23labP  eleP  
-1.00 0.37  (0.03)*** 0.11  (0.07)** 0.39  (0.08)*** 0.18 (0.02)*** 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard error of the estimated parameters. *** (**, *) 
denotes significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
 
 
Table 3:  Cost pass-through rates in the long-run equilibrium 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 With the energy intensity in the year 1995. 
Code 
GP 
2009 
Sector Labour 
cost pass-
through 
rates 
Material 
cost pass-
through 
rates 
Energy 
cost pass-
through 
rates 
Total  
cost pass-
through 
rates 
1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard    0.00 
1722 Manufacture of household and toilet paper >1  >1 >0.38 
2012 Manufacture of dyes and pigments =1  =1 0.37 
2013 Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals   =1 0.10 
2015 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds   =117 0.16 
2016 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms  =1 =1 0.42 
2042 Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations    0.00 
2219 Manufacture of other rubber products =1 =1 =1 0.75 
2313 Manufacture of hollow glass =1 >1  >0.60 
2314 Manufacture of glass fibres  =1  0.27 
2319 Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl.   =1  0.24 
235 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster =1 =1 =1 0.73 
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Pass-through elasticities on input costs vary significantly across industries from 0% to 75%. 
Producers of cement, lime and plaster, other rubber products and hollow glass are capable to 
pass-through a very significant fraction of domestic cost shocks to consumer (up to roughly 
75% of the total costs) in the long-run equilibrium. In contrast, producers of paper and 
paperboard, other basic inorganic chemicals, fertilizers and nitrogen compounds and, finally, 
perfumes and toilet preparations are capable to pass-through only a small fraction of domestic 
cost shocks, if any at all. While both groups might build extremes on the vulnerability scale, 
remaining industrial branches take an intermediate position with cost pass-through rates 
varying between roughly 25% and 40% in the long-run equilibrium. Additional costs induced 
by the EU ETS are therefore likely to be absorbed through a reduction of profit margins in 
most energy-intensive sectors, creating incentives to relocate business abroad. 
Turning now to the strategic component in our estimations, empirical evidence illustrates that 
all German EU ETS sectors, except for producers of dyes and pigments and other glassware, 
have a flexible mark-up over marginal costs.  Pass-through rates can therefore be considered as 
outcome of interaction between domestic and foreign firms in a particular industrial and market 
environment. In the presence of the incomplete pass-through domestic firms “capitalize” on the 
opportunity to increase their own prices if foreign competitors start charging higher prices. For 
example, following a 1% competitors’ price increase, manufacturers of cement, lime and 
plaster increase domestic prices by 0.37%. Alternatively, one might interpret these elasticities 
as “willingness” to alter mark-up if facing domestic price shocks (Clostermann 1996).   
In section 2 we argued that strategic interactions between domestic and foreign producers 
under conditions of imperfect competition will limit the ability of producers to pass-through 
domestic cost shocks. Contrary to expectations from equations (14) and (15), the adding-up 
restrictions on estimated elasticities are not always fulfilled in practice. This might occur due to 
the index aggregation problem which plagues both domestic and foreign price series. If 
domestic prices are set exclusively with respect to foreign producers’ prices – as in the sectors 
producing paper and paperboard and fertilizers and nitrogen compounds – increasing costs are 
fully absorbed by the profit margin of the domestic producer. The potential to pass-through 
domestic costs is clearly very limited in this case. In the remaining sectors, the evidence is 
somewhat inconclusive but for most sectors the following interrelationship holds: the higher 
the impact of foreign prices, the lower the ability to pass-through the domestic cost shocks, and 
vice versa. 
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Table 4: Market shares for domestic and foreign producers, the level of product homogeneity and market concentration in German energy-intensive sectors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Monopolies Commission (Monopolkommission 2007) and the German Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2010c, d). 
                                                 
18 The data for this level of sectoral disaggregation are available for the year 2008 only.  
19 Concentration degree as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (in absolute values multiplied by 10.000). The reference year is 2005. 
Code GP 2009 Sector Import value relative to 
the revenues of German  
producers in domestic 
market18 
Number of sub-sectors at 
the NACE 9-digit level 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index19 
17 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products    
1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard 0,38 11 344.86 
1722 Manufacture of household & toilet paper and paper products 0,36 11 849.53 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products    
2012 Manufacture of dyes and pigments 1,18 4 903.03 
2013 Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals 2,03 14 549.10 
2015 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 0,92 5 4013.88 
2016 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 0,83 14 2606.04 
2042 Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations 0,94 12 861.38 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products    
2219 Manufacture of other rubber products 0,78 7 533.14 
23 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products    
2313 Manufacture of hollow glass 0,44 4 701.75 
2314 Manufacture of glass fibres 1,55 3 1902.67 
2319 Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl. technical glassware 0,72 4 1625.59 
235 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 0,08 3 898.49 
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Now we are interested in explaining the differences across sectors in terms of cost pass-through 
rates and strategic interactions with foreign competitors. Theoretical framework in section 2 
(equation 9, 11 and 14) suggests that cost pass-through rate in strategic oligopoly depends on 
the following four factors: the substitutability between domestic and foreign varieties, market 
shares of domestic and foreign firms, relative prices of domestic and foreign firms and the 
conjectural variation. 
Additional data on industrial characteristics as reported in Table 4 are used to explain the 
variation in pass-through across sub-sectors. First, the substitutability between domestic and 
foreign varieties is difficult to proxy. We, therefore, make use of a more general approach 
measuring the level of product homogeneity in each sector. To account for the degree of 
product homogeneity across the sectors, we report the number of subsectors at the NACE 9-
digit level for each sector in our sample. We assume that the higher the number of sub-sectors, 
the more heterogeneous (at the lower level of sectoral disaggregation) the product markets are. 
Second, to measure how the German market is split between domestic and foreign producers 
we calculate the quotient of import values in each sector over the revenues of domestic firms 
gained in German market in the same sector. Third, the conjectural variation is hard to measure 
too. We, therefore, rely only on the data from the Monopolies Commission 
(Monopolkommission, 2007) on the concentration degree in German energy-intensive sectors. 
According to Table 5 which describes the distribution of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in 
German sectors at the NACE 4-digit level, each of sectors in our sample possesses a significant 
degree of market concentration: The sectoral Herfindahl-Hirschman indices in our sample are 
well above the median value (495.21) in all sectors except for producers of paper and paper 
board. Fourth, relative prices of domestic and foreign prices are not explicitly reported in Table 
4 but the corresponding plots can be found in Figure 3.  
Table 4 illustrates that the impact on the pass-through is ultimately determined by the interplay 
of individual effects working in different directions. 
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Table 5: Distribution of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in German sectors as the NACE 4-digit level  
 
Percentiles Smallest  
1% 
5% 
10% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
90% 
95% 
99% 
2.33 
21.68 
46.27 
125.86 
495.21 
1128.45 
2585.00 
3142.59 
6133.18 
1.28
1.99
2.31
2.33
Largest
6133.18
6245.16
8601.72
9761.61
Number of observations                               333 
Sum of wgt.                                                  333 
 
Mean                                                           928.944 
Std. Dev.                                                    1285.953 
 
Variance                                                     1653676 
Skewness                                                   3.002952 
Kurtosis                                                    15.46499 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Monopolies Commission 
(Monopolkommission 2007) 
We find that in more homogenous product markets – dyes and pigments, fertilizers and 
nitrogen compounds, glass fibres and other glass, processed, incl. technical glassware – the 
higher the market power, the lower the cost pass-through and the more pronounced the 
adjustment towards the foreign producers. Drawing on the specific example from the 
manufacturing of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, a sector with the highest degree of 
concentration in our sample and among the most concentrated industrial sectors in Germany 
(among 5% of most concentrated sectors in Germany), domestic prices can even be set 
exclusively with respect to foreign producers’ prices. According to Table 4, this is particularly 
likely to occur if the market is split almost equally between domestic and foreign producers 
(0.92, third column).  It is worth stressing that all remaining sectors in the category of 
homogenous product markets have lower market power and higher cost pass-through rates 
(between 24% and 37%) than producers of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds (16%) with the 
highest market power. 
Cement, lime and plaster, other rubber products and hollow glass fall into the category of 
relatively homogenous products too. In contrast to the previous group of sub-sectors, additional 
factors are likely to determine relatively high cost pass-through rate in these sectors (between 
60% and 75%). The graphical inspection of the plots in Figure 3 depicts that in first two sectors 
the prices of foreign competitors were above the domestic prices over a long period of time – 
this might have significantly facilitating the pass-through of domestic costs to consumers in the 
past as indicated by high cost pass-through rates. Given the fact that foreign producers serve a 
relatively small fraction of German market in the cement, lime and plaster sector and despite 
the fact that the price gap has recently disappeared, the significant potential to pass-through 
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domestic costs might still persist in the future. In contrast, the domestic producers of other 
rubber products might be exposed to a significant competitive pressure from foreign producers 
limiting the potential to pass-through domestic costs. 
In the more heterogeneous product markets – paper and paperboard, household and toilet paper 
and paper products, plastics in primary forms and perfumes and toilet preparations – the higher 
market concentration of domestic firms is, the higher the cost pass-through rate and the less 
pronounced the orientation towards the foreign producers’ prices. Consider manufacturers of 
plastics in primary forms and perfumes and toilet preparations which are exposed to a high 
penetration rate of foreign producers (0.83 and 0.92, respectively). The former industry is the 
second most concentrated sector in our sample (10% of most concentrated sectors in Germany). 
It is capable to pass-through more than 40% of total domestic costs to consumers in the long-
run with a moderate orientation towards the price development of foreign producers. The latter 
sector is much less concentrated – this results in much higher orientation towards the 
competitors’ prices and the disability to pass-through costs in the long-run. The observation 
that market concentration in heterogeneous markets leads to higher cost pass-through rates is 
confirmed for the manufacturers of paper and paperboard and household and toilet paper and 
paper products. The relatively low cost pass-through rate by producers of other basic inorganic 
chemicals (GP 2013) seems to be driven rather by the extreme high penetration of the market 
by the foreign producers (import/domestic revenue ratio: 2.03) than by the level of product 
homogeneity and the market power.  
Finally, we notice that short-run cost pass-through coefficients are reported in Table 9a.-d. in 
the Appendix. We observe a considerable heterogeneity with respect to the magnitude and the 
speed of the pass-through potential (column one) across sectors. Even in industries with high 
pass-through rates, the short-run cost pass-through potential varies substantially: While 
producers of cement, lime and plaster and other rubber products appear to bear a very 
significant fraction of cost increases over a long-time horizon, German manufacturers of 
hollow glass are found to rapidly pass-through costs to consumers.  Moreover, there is a 
difference between the short-run and the long-run degree of the pass-through: Sectors which 
are not able to pass-through costs in the long-run appear to be capable to pass-through at least a 
fraction of cost increases in the short run (e.g. manufacturers of paper and paperboard).  
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Diagnostic statistics and Granger causality 
Diagnostic statistics suggest that sectoral VEC models are reasonably specified (Table 10): All 
specifications pass the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests except for manufacturing of 
paper and paperboard. However, the Jarque-Bera (JB) test rejects the null hypothesis of 
normality of the residuals in most cases: The decomposition of the JB statistic into tests using 
separate measures of skewness and kurtosis demonstrate that the deviation from normality is 
due to excess kurtosis. In the applied work, VEC residuals are apparently found to be non-
normally distributed (Johansen and Juselius 1990, Juselius and MacDonald 2000, Bjørnland 
and Hungnes 2002). Since the properties of the VEC models are not very sensitive to 
deviations from the normality due to excess kurtosis, we consider our results to be still valid 
(see further Gonzalo 1994). 
The existence of one cointegrating vector suggests that there must be Granger causality in at 
least one direction in each sectoral VEC model. While the direction of causation is not evident, 
we tested it by reviewing the significance of the error-correction terms (long-run causality) and 
by observing the significance of the lagged differences of the respective variables (short-run 
causality). The following patterns emerged: All estimated error correction terms which are 
reported in the ECM for domestic prices (Table 9a.-d., first column) have the correct sign and 
are statistically significant. In 5 out of 12 sectors our findings suggest a uni-directional long-
run causality running from input factor prices and foreign output prices to domestic prices. 
Those sectors are manufacture of paper and paper boar, manufacture of household, toilet paper 
and paper products, manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals, manufacture of other 
rubber products and manufacture of cement, lime and plaster. Obviously, domestic prices in 
these sectors are Granger-caused in the long-run by competitors’ prices (and input factor 
prices). Hence, the latter can be treated as exogenous within a given VEC framework. The 
results for manufacturing of other rubber products, hollow glass and other glass, processed 
reinforce the bi-directional long-run causality between domestic and foreign prices.  
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5. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
For the EU policy-makers, the risk of sector-specific carbon leakage is at the centre of 
discussions on how to design effective climate policy under globally asymmetric carbon 
constraints. The results in this paper cast some doubt on the usefulness of too generous 
provision of benchmarked emissions allowances free of charge after 2012 to energy-intensive 
sectors. Moreover, the current proposal of the European Commission to possibly introduce 
“additional and alternative means” to address the risk of carbon leakage, most notably through 
the inclusion of imports into the EU ETS, needs to be put into perspective (EU 2010). Strategic 
interactions between domestic and foreign firms could be a critical factor for the design of 
appropriate countermeasures to delimitate carbon leakage. 
To asses the exposure of energy-intensive sectors to the risk of carbon leakage in this paper, we 
have combined time series of producer prices of German and foreign firms with data on 
industry characteristics to estimate the pass-through potential of domestic cost shocks. Results 
for 12 German energy-intensive sectors provide evidence for a significant role of included 
industrial characteristics in explaining the extent of cost pass-through rates, but the impact of 
foreign firms’ prices appears to be just as important. The estimated cost pass-through 
relationships differ from the traditional approach in the empirical research: The inclusion of the 
foreign competitor’ price as the dependent variable in the respective pass-through equation 
zoom in the analysis on pass-through rates as outcome of interaction between domestic and 
foreign firms in a particular industrial and market environment (Gangnes 1993).   
Facing domestic cost shocks, German firms raise prices less than proportionally. Hence, 
additional costs induced by the EU ETS are likely to be absorbed through a reduction of profit 
margin in the long-run, rather than through decreasing market shares. However, the impact on 
the mark-ups varies significantly across the sectors. In 6 out of 12 cases, empirical results give 
support for medium to high pass-through rates ranging between roughly 40% and 75%. 
Producers of paper and paperboard, basic inorganic chemicals, fertilizers and nitrogen 
compounds and perfumes and toilet preparations are found to pass only a small fraction of 
domestic cost shocks (if any at all!) , with long-run cost pass-through rates varying between 0% 
and 15%. Remaining sectors take an intermediate position with cost pass-through rates of about 
25%.  
The relatively low long-run cost pass-through rates in our sample – in comparison to studies 
which do not consider strategic interactions – are consistent with both predictions from the 
theoretical model and earlier findings of Gross and Schmitt (2000). Contrary to the study by 
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Gerald and al. (2009), the extent of cost pass-through varies not only across energy-intensive 
sectors, but also within the respective industry at the sub-sectors level. This illustrates the 
necessity to consider data at the higher level of sectoral disaggregation. 
The variation in the pass-through across sub-sectors is explained by industry characteristics 
including the import penetration, the level of product homogeneity, the market power of 
domestic firms and the price charged by foreign competitors in German markets. Perhaps the 
most interesting result in this paper is that most of the German EU ETS sectors have a flexible 
mark-up over marginal costs: Strategic interactions with foreign competitors limit the impact 
on the domestic cost pass-through rates. Reversely, domestic firms “capitalize” on the 
opportunity to increase their own prices if foreign competitors start charging higher prices. The 
detected impacts are generally consistent with the predictions of the model of strategic 
oligopoly employed in this paper. But the overall impact on the pass-through is ultimately 
determined by the interplay of individual effects working in different directions. 
In most theoretical and empirical papers, market concentration reduces the pass-through 
potential. This result holds in our sample for homogenous product markets only. High market 
power of domestic firms on relatively homogenous product markets leads to lower cost pass-
through rates and to the more pronounced orientation towards the foreign producers’ prices. 
Drawing on the specific example from manufacturing of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, a 
sector with the highest degree of concentration in our sample and among the most concentrated 
industrial sectors in Germany, domestic prices can even be set exclusively with respect to 
foreign producers’ prices. The higher the market concentration of domestic firms in more 
heterogeneous product markets, the higher the cost pass-through potential and the less 
pronounced the adjustment towards the foreign producers’ prices.  
Using these findings as a criterion to asses the vulnerability of German EU ETS sectors, we 
conclude that sectors with low cost pass-through rates might be shortlisted to receive 
preferential treatment in the third phase of the EU ETS from 2013 on. Additional costs induced 
by the EU ETS are likely to be absorbed through a reduction of profit margins, creating 
incentives to relocate business abroad in few sectors only. Remaining sectors with medium to 
high cost pass-through rates might still be forced to move factories out of the EU's borders due 
to an adverse impact on market shares, but severe implications on profit margins are rather 
unlikely. 
In the oligopolistic framework with strategic interactions firms’ decisions on how to adjust 
market shares and profit margins are endogenous to a particular shock. The main insight from 
the empirical part is that the hypothesis of strategic interactions with foreign competitors holds 
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for the most of the EU ETS sectors in Germany. Introducing additional offsetting instruments – 
e.g. the inclusion of importers into the EU ETS – is likely to produce an opportunity for 
domestic firms to “capitalize” on increasing prices of foreign competitors. This finding is 
directly related to the recent discussion on appropriate countermeasures to delimitate carbon 
leakage in the energy-intensive sectors in the EU. 
We close with limitations of our study and suggestions on future work. First, a shortcoming of 
the used data set refers to the small number of energy-intensive sectors with a sufficient time 
horizon for which domestic producer prices and matching foreign price series exist. The limited 
industry sample does not allow regressing estimates of pass-through elasticities on a number of 
industry characteristics to receive robust empirical results. Second, since no price data on a 
more frequent basis than monthly is available for sectors of interest and the EU ETS is still in 
an early stage, the pass-through capacity of additional carbon prices cannot be directly 
estimated. Using labour, material and energy costs as proxy for carbon costs has practical 
advantage of estimating long-run cost pass-through relationships for few energy-intensive 
sectors. But firms’ response to carbon costs might differ from their response to other costs.  We 
will therefore leave the empirical estimation of carbon cost pass-through and the design of 
optimal offsetting instruments to reduce carbon leakage in strategic oligopolies to future 
research. 
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Mathematical Appendix 
Equation (2) and (3) 
In order to derive the demand functions (2) for each variant of the composite good ix , 
1,..., Di n ,  the utility function is being maximised under the respective budget constraint (i.e. 
the fraction of the budget used for these goods): 
 
, ,
max
di fjx x 
 
1 1 1 1
[ (1 ) ]
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The first order condition (FOC) for the variant dix  is given as:   
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In analogy, one receives the following FOC for the variant fjx : 
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Solving for   and plugging into (2A) and (3A) yields the following demand functions: 
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and  
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
     
 
     D Fn nfj fj di fj
i j
x p a a p a p U
 
           (5A) 
The expenditure function is given by: 
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Plugging P  and X  from (7A) in (4A) and (5A) yields the demand function for domestic and 
foreign varieties: 
    
di
di
px a X
P

           (2) 
and 
(1 )
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fj
fj
p
x a X
P

          (3) 
 
Equation 9 
The profits of the domestic firm k  which is identical to other 1Dn  domestic firms but not to 
Fn  foreign firms is given by: 
 max
dk
dk dk dk dkp
p c x             (5) 
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Using (7), the equation  (8A) can be restated as:  
!
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Solving (8) for dkp we obtain the first order condition: 
1
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Equation (10) 
Let   be defined as follows: 
1
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a p p a p                      (9A) 
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Totally differentiating (4), we obtain:   
1D Fn n
dk di k df
i jdk di k df
P P PdP dp dp dp
p p p



              (10A) 
11 1
111 11
1 1
1
(1 )
FD
D F
nn
fj fjdi k di k
jdk dk i
n n
dk
di k fj
i j
p dpp dp
p dpdP
p
p p
         
  
     



  

 
   (11A) 
1
1
(1 )1 ( 1)[1 ] [1 ]
dk
dk fjd F
di
pdP
P dp pan n
a p



 
           
 
Using that dk di kp p   one obtains the equation (10): 
1
1
(1 )(1 ) fjD F
di
pan n
a p



 
          
       (10) 
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Table 6a.: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test on domestic output 
prices  
ADF PP 
Level First-diff. Level First-diff. 
Model Model 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
1712
domP  -3.40*** -3.52*** -4.17*** -4.19*** -2.22*** -2.26*** -5.77*** -5.76*** 
1722
domP  -0.54*** -1.39*** -11.94*** -11.96*** -0.82*** -1.65*** -12.04*** -12.04*** 
2012
domP  -1.53*** -1.97*** -14.57*** -14.57*** -1.44*** -1.91*** -14.59*** -14.60*** 
2013
domP  -0.88*** -1.64*** -5.62*** -5.73*** -0.30*** -1.16*** -9.97*** -10.03*** 
2014
domP  -1.87*** -3.75*** -3.96*** -3.90*** -1.04*** -2.83*** -9.03*** -8.95*** 
2015
domP  1.84
*** 0.44*** -5.32*** -8.27*** 2.58*** 1.03*** -7.87*** -8.27*** 
2016
domP  -0.64*** -3.27** -8.94*** -9.08*** -0.52*** -2.41*** -8.92*** -9.07*** 
2042
domP  -0.64*** -1.72*** -12.50*** -12.46*** -0.65*** -1.80*** -12.50*** -12.46*** 
2110
domP  -0.97*** -2.21*** -14.26*** -14.22*** -0.90*** -2.21*** -14.53*** -14.50*** 
2219
domP  2.11*** 0.04*** -12.39*** -10.85*** 2.13*** 0.04*** -12.38*** -12.88*** 
2229
domP  -3.7***  -3.52*** -13.35*** -13.39*** -3.72*** -3.55*** -13.38*** -13.42*** 
2313
domP  2.72*** 0.61*** -4.90*** -12.29*** 1.84*** 0.47*** -11.62*** -12.34*** 
2314
domP  -1.59*** -1.41*** -15.73*** -15.72*** -1.76*** -1.80*** -15.54*** -15.56*** 
2319
domP  -1.28
*** -1.34*** -13.35*** -13.34*** -1.28*** -1.34*** -13.35*** -13.34*** 
2391
domP  -1.65
*** -1.63*** -12.85*** -12.83*** -1.67*** -1.65*** -12.85*** -12.83*** 
235
domP  -0.42
*** -0.56*** -6.52*** -6.69*** -0.44*** -0.56*** -10.86*** -10.97*** 
 
Notes: The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2008. The MacKinnon critical values across the 
sample are -3.47*** / -2.88**/ -2.58* for the model with a constant and -4.01*** / -3.44** / -3.14* for a model 
with a constant and a trend at the 1% / 5% / 10% levels of significance. The optimum lag lengths are SIC-based. 
Test critical values for the PP test are -3.47***/-2.88**/-2.58* for a model with a constant and -4.01***/-3.44**/ 
-3.14* for a model with a constant and a trend at the 1% / 5% / 10% levels of significance. 
 
The notation * (**, ***) means the rejection of the hypothesis at the 10% (5% or 1%) significance level, 
respectively.  
Acronyms of the variables: The superscripts dom and for indicate domestic and foreign output prices, 
respectively. For labour, electricity and material we use the superscripts lab, ele and mat. The subscripts represent 
the number of a sub-sector in the GP 2009 classification at the 2-, 3- and 4-digit level. The corresponding sectors 
are enumerated in Table 1. 
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Table 6b.: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test on foreign output 
prices 
 
ADF PP 
Level First-diff. Level First-diff. 
Model Model 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
1712
forP  -2.70*** -2.80*** -4.82*** -4.83*** -2.14*** -2.20*** -7.95*** -7.92*** 
1722
forP  -1.11*** -2.30*** -6.55*** -6.54*** -0.89*** -1.97*** -12.22*** -12.19*** 
2012
forP  -1.68*** -3.48*** -6.11*** -6.27*** -0.85*** -2.11*** -11.03*** -11.11*** 
2013
forP  0.75*** -1.05*** -9.46*** -9.61*** 1.13*** -0.85*** -9.44*** -9.60*** 
2014
forP  -1.38*** -3.21** -7.19*** -7.19*** -1.06*** -2.85*** -7.14*** -7.15*** 
2015
forP  0.36
*** -1.08*** -6.90*** -7.23*** 3.38*** 1.54*** -6.62*** -6.72*** 
2016
forP  -1.21*** -3.16** -6.12*** -6.08*** -0.89*** -2.21*** -4.60*** -4.56*** 
2042
forP  -0.47*** -2.84*** -12.16*** -12.13*** -0.48*** -2.96*** -12.15*** -12.11*** 
2110
forP  -1.75*** -1.97*** -10.53*** -10.52*** -1.81*** -1.91*** -10.54*** -10.53*** 
2219
forP  -1.40*** -1.75*** -9.27*** -9.25*** -1.48*** -1.52*** -9.34*** -9.32*** 
2229
forP  -2.44*** -2.43*** -9.85*** -9.82*** -2.35*** -2.35*** -9.85*** -9.82*** 
2313
forP  1.67*** -1.49*** -10.94*** -11.24*** 1.57*** -1.53*** -10.92*** -11.13*** 
2314
forP  -1.86*** -1.98*** -11.41*** -11.38*** -2.11*** -2.22*** -11.41*** -11.38*** 
2319
forP  0.03
*** -1.63*** -11.70*** -11.67*** -0.05*** -1.80*** -11.65*** -11.63*** 
2391
forP  -1.62
*** -1.65*** -11.47*** -11.44*** -1.80*** -1.83*** -11.47*** -11.44*** 
235
forP  -1.10
*** -1.72*** -7.83*** -7.80*** -1.09v -1.51*** -7.76*** -7.74*** 
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Table 6c.: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test on input prices 
 
ADF PP 
Level First-diff. Level First-diff. 
Model Model 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
C
on
st
an
t 
C
on
st
an
t &
 
tre
nd
 
17
labP  -0.79
*** -1.99*** -11.34*** -11.30*** -1.57*** -3.51*** -26.98*** -27.62*** 
20
labP  -1.48
*** -1.16*** -11.59*** -11.71*** -4.29*** -4.27*** -27.59*** -31.11*** 
22
labP  -0.51
*** -2.48*** -6.62*** -6.58*** -0.86*** -2.70*** -17.60*** -17.52*** 
23
labP  -1.84
*** -0.87*** -13.00*** -13.17*** -1.53*** -1.97*** -19.15*** -19.24*** 
eleP  0.01
*** -0.84*** -9.61*** -10.21*** -0.10*** -0.76*** -9.75*** -10.21*** 
222
matP  -0.56
*** -2.13*** -7.12*** -7.08*** 0.18*** -1.58*** -7.03*** -6.82*** 
27
matP  -0.91
*** -2.68*** -4.18*** -9.74*** 0.06*** -1.99*** -10.11*** -10.15*** 
2017
matP  0.72
*** -0.84*** -10.55*** -10.78*** 0.32*** -1.45*** -11.18*** -11.24*** 
192
matP  -1.40
*** -2.82*** -9.21*** -9.20*** -1.26*** -2.53*** -9.23*** -9.20*** 
201
matP  -0.35
*** -2.91*** -7.20*** -7.44*** -0.07*** -2.13*** -7.29*** -7.38*** 
20
matP  0.02
*** -2.74*** -7.26*** -7.58*** 0.40*** -1.92*** -7.45*** -7.68*** 
 
Sectoral assignment for input factors material and labour 
Price index for input factor material20 Wages  
222
matP   Manufacture of plastics products (GP 222) 
27
matP  Manufacture of basic metals (GP 27)  
2017
matP  Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms (GP 2017) 
192
matP  Manufacture of refined petroleum products  (GP 192) 
201
matP  Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen      
                 compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary  
                 forms (GP 201) 
20
matP  Manufacture of chemicals (GP20) 
 
17
labP       Manufacture of paper and paper products (GP 17) 
20
labP       Manufacture of chemical products (GP 20) 
22
labP       Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (GP 22) 
23
labP       Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (GP 23) 
 
                                                 
20 We use also input factors which can be found in Table 1.  
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Table 7: List of dummy variables 
 
 
d96_01: The German “Electricity Feed Law“ (Stromeinspeisegesetz) which guarantees premium prices for 
producers of electricity from renewable resources  was approved by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht). The input factor electricity is used in all sectoral models to proxy the input factor 
energy. This seems to be the most parsimonious way to achieve the normality (skewness) of residuals in sectoral 
VEC models. 
 
 
d97_01: Sharp increase of the steel price following an exceptionally strong growth in demand. The input factor 
basic metals (GP09-27) is intensively employed in the production of both dyes and pigments (GP09-2012) and 
other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2013) and used in sectoral models to proxy material input, respectively. 
This seems to be the most parsimonious way to avoid the residual heteroscedasticity in both sectoral VEC models. 
 
 
d01_01:  The dummy is needed to address a price increase of foreign producers of other basic inorganic chemicals 
(GP 2042) and to achieve the normality of residuals in sectoral VEC model (GP09-2042).  
 
 
d07_01: Strong price increase by foreign manufacturers of hollow glass (GP09-2313). Dummy was used to 
achieve the normality (skewness) of residuals in sectoral VEC models.  
 
 
d06_08: Strong price increase by foreign manufacturers of glass fibres (GP09-2314). Dummy was used to achieve 
the normality (skewness) of residuals in sectoral VEC models.  
 
 
d02_10:  Strong price decrease by foreign producers of cement, lime and plaster (GP09-235) after a cartel has 
been discovered. This seems to be the most parsimonious way to achieve the normality in the sectoral VEC model. 
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Table 8a.: Number of cointegrating relations at the 0.05 level (GP09 1712 – 2015) 
Manufacture of paper and paperboard (GP09-1712) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
Endogenous variables: 1712
domP , 1712
forP , 17
labP , 222
matP and eleP ; number of selected lags: 5 (AIC: 3); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
 
Manufacture of household and toilet paper and paper products (GP09-1722) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
Endogenous variables: 1722
domP , 1722
forP ,  17
labP , 222
matP and eleP ; number of selected lags: 7 (AIC: 4); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
 
Manufacture of dyes and pigments (GP09-2012) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
Endogenous variables: 2012
domP , 2012
forP ,  20
labP , 27
matP and eleP ; number of selected lags: 3 (AIC: 3); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, 
d_97_01 
 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2013) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 2013
domP , 2013
forP ,  20
labP , 27
matP and eleP ; number of selected lags: 4 (AIC: 2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, 
d97_01 
 
Manufacture of other basic organic chemicals (GP09-2014) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
Endogenous variables: 2014
domP , 2014
forP ,  20
labP , 2013
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 5 (AIC:2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2015) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
021 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 2015
domP , 2015
forP ,  20
labP , 192
matP and eleP ; number of selected lags: 6 (AIC: 2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
                                                 
21 The hypothesis that there is at least one cointegration relationship cannot be rejected at the 0.1 level. 
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Table 8b.: Number of cointegrating relations at the 0.05 level (GP09 2016 – 2314) 
Manufacture of plastics in primary forms (GP09-2016) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 2016
domP , 2016
forP ,  20
labP , 2014
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 5 (AIC:2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2042) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
2 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 2042
domP , 2042
forP ,  20
labP , 222
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 6 (AIC:2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, d01_01 
 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products (GP09-2110) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Endogenous variables: 2110
domP , 2110
forP ,  20
labP , 2014
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 4 (AIC:4); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
 
Manufacture of other rubber products (GP09-2219) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 2219
domP , 2219
forP ,  22
labP , 2017
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 10 (AIC:2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01 
 
Manufacture of hollow glass (GP09-2313) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 2313
domP , 2313
forP ,  23
labP , 201
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 8 (AIC:4); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, d07_01 
 
Manufacture of glass fibres (GP09-2314) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
222 
2 
2 
Endogenous variables: 2314
domP , 2314
forP ,  23
labP , 201
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 6 (AIC:2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, d06_08 
                                                 
22 Max eigenvalue statistic which fails to reject the hypothesis of 2 cointegrating equations (in favour of 1 
cointegration equitation) is very close to the critical value of 0.05.   
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Table 8c.: Number of cointegrating relations at the 0.05 level (GP09 2319 – 2391) 
Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl.  (GP09-2319) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
5 
1 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Endogenous variables: 2319
domP , 2319
forP ,  23
labP , 201
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 6 (AIC:2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies 
 
Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster (GP09-235) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Endogenous variables: 235
domP , 235
forP ,  23
labP , 20
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 5 (AIC: 4); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, d02_10 
 
Manufacture of other rubber products (GP09-2391) 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
No Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Intercept 
Trend 
Trace 
Max-Eig 
5 
1 
4 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Endogenous variables: 2391
domP , 2391
forP ,  23
labP , 20
matP and eleP ; number of lags: 5 (AIC: 2); exogenous variables: centred seasonal dummies, d96_01, d00_04 
 
 
Note: In parentheses we indicate the lag length suggested by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
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Table 9a.: Short-run relationship between output and input prices (GP09 1712 – 2012) 
 
Manufacture of paper and paperboard (GP09-1712)  
 
1712,
om
u
d
tP  1712,or uf tP  leuetP  17,ulabtP  222,atum tP  
     1tec   -0.15 (0.05)*** 0.04 (0.05) 0.29 (0.12)** -0.09 (0.10)   0.01 (0.10) 
1712,u
dom
t iP   i=1         0.32 (0.11)*** i=2         0.30 (0.13)**    i=1    0.11 (0.05)**  
1712,u
for
t iP   i=1         0.17 (0.11)* i=4        -0.28 (0.11)*** i=1         0.25 (0.13)** i=2         0.19 (0.13)*   i=1    0.07 (0.05)** 
el
u
e
t iP   i=4         0.04 (0.03)* i=5       - 0.08 (0.03)* i=5        -0.07 (0.03)** i=1        0.24 (0.08)*** i=3        0.20 (0.08) *** i=1        -0.09 (0.06)* i=1    0.02 (0.01)** i=2    0.04 (0.03)* 
i=3   -0.03 (0.01)*** 
17,
lab
tu iP   i=5       -0.08 (0.05)**   i=1       -0.70 (0.10)*** i=2       -0.52 (0.11)*** 
i=3       -0.41 (0.11)***  
i=4       -0.26 (0.11)***   
 
222,u
mat
t iP   i=4        0.37 (0.23)* i=5       -0.31 (0.23)* i=3        0.59 (0.26)** i=5       -0.48 (0.25)** i=1        -0.77 (0.57)* i=3         0.83 (0.60)* i=5      -1.05 (0.46)**  i=1     0.39 (0.10)*** i=2     0.17 (0.10)** 
i=3    -0.17 (0.10)** 
i=5    -0.20 (0.10)** 
 
Manufacture of household and toilet paper and paper products (GP09-1722) 
 
1722,
om
u
d
tP  1722,or uf tP  leuetP  17,ulabtP  222,atum tP  
      1tec   
-0.16 (0.05)*** 0.12 (0.06)** 0.50 (0.11)*** 0.23 (0.08)*** -0.01 (0.02) 
1722,u
dom
t iP    i=7         0.39 (0.12)***  i=1        0.26 (0.17)* i=3        0.25 (0.17)* 
i=5       -0.70 (0.16)*** 
i=7        0.39 (0.17)** 
i=2        0.07 (0.04)** 
i=4        0.07 (0.04)** 
1722,u
for
t iP   i=3        0.12 (0.07)** i=4       -0.13 (0.07)** 
i=5        0.16 (0.07)** 
i=7        0.09 (0.07)* 
i=2        0.27 (0.09)*** 
i=3       -0.16 (0.10)* 
i=4       -0.37 (0.18)** 
i=5       -0.28 (0.18)* 
i=6       -0.26 (0.13)** 
i=7        0.18 (0.13)*  
i=7       -0.05 (0.03)** 
el
u
e
t iP   i=7       -0.07 (0.03)**       i=2        0.10 (0.04)** i=4       -0.06 (0.05)* i=1        0.27 (0.08)*** i=3        0.24 (0.08)*** 
i=6        0.18 (0.09)** 
i=1       -0.08 (0.06)*  i=2        0.03 (0.01)** 
i=5       -0.03 (0.02)** 
i=6       -0.02 (0.02)* 
17,
lab
tu iP   i=1       -0.22 (0.08)***   i=2       -0.12 (0.08)* 
i=3       -0.20 (0.08)*** 
i=4       -0.14 (0.08)** 
i=5       -0.13 (0.07)** 
i=6       -0.16 (0.06)*** 
i=7       -0.09 (0.05)**       
i=1        0.18 (0.12)* 
i=2        0.24 (0.12)** 
i=1        0.85 (0.22)*** 
i=2        0.81 (0.23)*** 
i=3        0.76 (0.22)*** 
i=4        0.71 (0.21)*** 
i=5        0.55 (0.19)*** 
i=6        0.39 (0.16)*** 
i=7        0.19 (0.12)* 
i=6        0.23 (0.12)** 
i=7        0.18 (0.09)** 
 
222,u
mat
t iP   i=1        0.27 (0.20)* i=7        0.55 (0.21)*** i=3        0.49 (0.34)* i=1       -1.18 (0.56)** i=1        0.78 (0.41)** i=5       -0.87 (0.46)** 
i=7       -0.60 (0.42)*  
i=1        0.46 (0.10)*** 
i=2        0.23 (0.11)** 
i=3       -0.21 (0.11)** 
  
Manufacture of dyes and pigments (GP09-2012) 
 
2012,
om
u
d
tP  2012,or uf tP  leuetP  20,ulab tP  27,umattP  
1tec   -0.16 (0.05)*** -0.03 (0.05) 0.09 (0.09) 0.23 (0.10)** -0.23 (0.07)*** 
2012,  udom t iP    i=1       -0.29 (0.16)** i=2       -0.25 (0.18)* i=1         0.21 (0.12)** i=3         0.19 ((0.12)* 
2012,  ufor t iP  i=2         0.14 (0.08)** i=3         0.22 (0.09)*** i=1         0.15 (0.09)** i=2         0.28 (0.09)*** 
 
 i=2       -0.32 (0.17)** i=2        -0.19 ((0.12)* 
 
 euelt iP  i=1         0.05 (0.04)* i=1        0.10 (0.04)*** i=2       -0.05 (0.04)* i=1        0.30 (0.07)*** i=3        0.14 (0.07)** i=1        0.12 (0.08)*   
20,  lab t iuP  i=1         0.07 (0.04)**  i=2        0.23 (0.09)*** I=3        0.13 (0.08)** i=1       -0.60 (0.08)*** i=2       -0.33 (0.09)*** 
i=3       -0.22 (0.08)*** 
 
27,  matt iuP   i=1        0.07 (0.04)** i=3        0.06 (0.04)* i=2       -0.12 (0.08)* i=3        0.21 (0.08)*** i=1       -0.12 (0.08)* i=2        0.14 (0.08)** 
i=3        0.27 (0.08)*** 
i=1         0.15 (0.05)*** 
i=2         0.13 (0.05)** 
i=3         0.19 (0.06)*** 
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Table 9b.: Short-run relationship between output and input prices (GP09 2013 – 2016) 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2013) 
 
2013,
om
u
d
tP  2013,or uf tP  leuetP  20,ulab tP  27,umattP  
     1tec   
-0.10 (0.03)*** -0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.03)** -0.01 (0.03) -0.08 (0.02)*** 
2013,  udom t iP  i=1        0.20 (0.08)*** i=2        0.29 (0.08)*** 
i=3        0.14 (0.09)* 
i=4        0.13 (0.09)* 
 i=4       -0.22 (0.09)***  i=3        0.18 (0.10)**  
2013,  ufor t iP   i=1        0.18 (0.09)**   i=2        -0.08 (0.04)** i=4        -0.07 (0.04)** 
 euelt iP  i=2        0.12 (0.07)* i=4        -0.16 (0.12)* i=1        0.29 (0.07)*** i=3        0.13 (0.07)** i=1        0.13 (0.08)*  
20,  lab t iuP  i=3        0.12 (0.09)* i=1        0.21 (0.13)* i=2        0.21 (0.15)* 
i=4        0.19 (0.13)* 
i=2        0.23 (0.09)*** 
i=3        0.17 (0.09)** 
i=1       -0.61 (0.09)*** 
i=2       -0.36 (0.10)*** 
i=3       -0.29 (0.10)*** 
i=1         0.08 (0.06)* 
27,  matt iuP   i=2        0.21 (0.13)** i=3        0.25 (0.13)** i=2       -0.15 (0.08)** i=3        0.20 (0.08)*** i=1       -0.14 (0.08)** i=2        0.15 (0.09)** 
i=3        0.20 (0.09)** 
i=1         0.15 (0.06)*** 
i=2         0.15 (0.06)*** 
i=3         0.19 (0.06)*** 
 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2015) 
 
2015,
om
u
d
tP  2015,or uf tP  leuetP  20,ulab tP   192,atum tP  
1tec   
-0.12 (0.07)** 0.21 (0.07)*** -0.04 (0.05) -0.12 (0.05)** 0.08 (0.11) 
2015,  udom t iP  i=1        0.18 (0.10)** i=2        0.37 (0.12)*** i=2        0.60 (0.12)*** i=6        0.26 (0.13)** i=1        0.12 (0.08)* i=4        0.14 (0.08)** 
i=5       -0.17 (0.09)** 
i=1        0.12 (0.09)* 
i=2        0.18 (0.10)** 
i=6       -0.17 (0.10)* 
i=4        0.29 (0.20)* 
i=5       -0.70 (0.21)*** 
 
2015,  ufor t iP  i=2       -0.20 (0.11)** i=5        0.13 (0.08)* 
i=6       -0.20 (0.09)** 
i=1        0.55 (0.10)*** 
i=3        0.21 (0.10)** 
i=4       -0.18 (0.10)** 
i=5        0.21 (0.09)*** 
i=6       -0.13 (0.09)* 
i=3        0.10 (0.07)* i=2        -0.15 (0.09)** 
i=3        -0.11 (0.08)* 
i=5        -0.10 (0.07)*  
i=4        0.24 (0.16)* 
 euelt iP  i=1        0.14 (0.10)* i=4       -0.20 (0.11)** i=1        0.15 (0.11)* i=6        0.21 (0.11)** i=1        0.24 (0.08)***   
20,  lab t iuP   i=1       -0.18 (0.13)* i=2       -0.22 (0.15)* i=2        0.16 (0.10)* i=3        0.17 (0.10)* 
i=6        0.17 (0.09)** 
i=1       -0.61 (0.09)*** 
i=2       -0.41 (0.11)*** 
i=3       -0.33 (0.12)*** 
i=5       -0.16 (0.12)*  
 
192,  umat t iP  i=1        0.13 (0.06)** i=2        0.17 (0.06)*** i=1        0.10 (0.06)** i=4        0.13 (0.06)** 
i=5       -0.08 (0.06)* 
i=1        0.06 (0.04)* i=6         0.07 (0.05)* i=1        0.21 (0.10)** 
 
 
Manufacture of plastics in primary forms (GP09-2016) 
 
2016,
om
u
d
tP  2016,or uf tP  leuetP  20,ulab tP   2014,at um tP  
    1tec   
-0.14 (0.04)*** -0.04 (0.04) 0.14 (0.06)*** 0.13 (0.06)** -0.15 (0.06)** 
2016,u
dom
t iP   i=1        0.21 (0.09)** i=5        0.13 (0.09)* i=1        0.17 (0.11)*  i=1       -0.33 (0.16)** i=1        0.26 (0.17)* i=4       -0.24 (0.17)* 
i=5       -0.23 (0.16)* 
2016,u
for
t iP   i=1        0.30 (0.08)*** i=1        0.62 (0.10)*** i=4      - 0.26 (0.13)** i=1       -0.19 (0.13)* i=2       -0.23 (0.18)* i=1        0.48 (0.15)*** 
el
u
e
t iP   i=1        0.09 (0.05)** i=1      -0.09 (0.07)* i=1        0.25 (0.07)*** i=3        0.17 (0.08)**   
20,
lab
tu iP   i=1        0.09 (0.05)*  i=2        0.13 (0.10)* i=1       -0.66 (0.09)*** i=2       -0.42 (0.11)*** 
i=3       -0.31 (0.11)*** 
i=4       -0.14 (.011)* 
i=5       -0.14 (0.09)* 
i=1        0.17 (0.09)** 
2014,u
mat
t iP    i=3        0.12 (0.07)** i=1        0.21 (0.09)*** i=1        0.22 (0.10)** i=2       -0.22 (0.10)** i=3        0.42 (0.10)**** 
i=5        0.19 (0.10)** 
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Table 9c.: Short-run relationship between output and input prices (GP09 2042 – 2313) 
Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals (GP09-2042) 
 
2042,
om
u
d
tP  2042,or uf tP  leuetP  20,ulab tP   222,atum tP  
     1tec   
-0.24 (0.05)*** 0.06 (0.03)** 0.06 (0.13) 0.22 (0.15)* -0.03 (0.02) 
2042,u
dom
t iP    i=2        0.09 (0.06)* i=3       -0.72 (0.24)*** i=6       -0.36 (0.21)** i=4       -0.47 (0.25)**  
2042,u
for
t iP     i=1        0.43 (0.28)* i=2        0.60 (0.29)** i=2        0.61 (0.33)** i=5       -0.56 (0.32)** i=1       -0.10 (0.05)** 
el
u
e
t iP   i=1        0.05 (0.03)* i=3        0.08 (0.03)*** 
i=5        0.07 (0.03)** 
i=3        0.04 (0.02)** 
i=4       -0.03 (0.02)* 
i=6       -0.04 (0.02)* 
i=1        0.21 (0.07)*** 
i=3        0.15 (0.08)** 
 i=1        0.02 (0.01)* 
i=2        0.03 (0.01)** 
20,
lab
tu iP   i=5       -0.06 (0.04)* i=6       -0.03 (0.029* i=2        0.19 (0.09)** i=3        0.21 (0.10)** 
i=6        0.13 (0.08)* 
i=1       -0.64 (0.09)*** 
i=2       -0.44 (0.11)*** 
i=3       -0.33 (0.11)*** 
 
222,u
mat
t iP   i=5        0.34 (0.23)* i=6       -0.31 (0.22)* i=6       -0.24 (0.15)* i=2       -1.09 (0.61)** i=2        1.10 (0.70)* i=1        0.46 (0.10)*** i=2        0.22 (0.11)** 
i=3       -0.19 (0.11)** 
 
Manufacture of other rubber products (GP09-2219) 
 
2219,
om
u
d
tP  2219,or uf tP  leuetP  22,ulab tP   2017,at um tP  
1tec   -0.06 (0.02)*** -0.04 (0.02)** -0.24 (0.07)*** 0.15 (0.05)*** 0.10 (0.09) 
2219,  udom t iP  i=2       -0.26 (0.09)*** i=7        0.16 (0.10)* i=9        0.20 (0.10)** i=1       -0.73 (0.40)** i=3       -0.90 (0.40)** i=2        0.33 (0.24)*  
2219,  ufor t iP  i=5        -0.15 (0.11)* i=8        -0.16 (0.10)* 
i=9         0.32 (0.11)*** 
i=1        0.40 (0.10)*** 
i=10      0.26 (0.11)** 
i=8        -1.00 (0.42)** 
i=9        -0.84 (0.43)** 
i=9        0.38 (0.26)* i=10       -0.73 (0.49)* 
el
u
e
t iP   i=2         0.03 (0.02)* i=3         0.03 (0.02)* 
i=9        -0.04 (0.02)* 
i=8        0.04 (0.02)** i=1        0.20 (0.08)*** 
i=3        0.20 (0.10)** 
i=6        0.12 (0.10)* 
i=4        0.11 (0.06)** 
i=5       -0.08 (0.06)* 
i=6       -0.08 (0.06)* 
 
22,  lab t iuP  i=1         0.07 (0.05)* i=4        0.10 (0.05)** i=10     -0.10 (0.04)** i=4        0.37 (0.19)** i=1       -0.39 (0.11)*** i=3        0.29 (0.12)*** 
i=5        0.19 (0.12)* 
i=10     -0.31 (0.11)*** 
 
2017,  umat t iP   i=5       -0.04 (0.02)* i=8       -0.03 (0.02)* i=1       -0.15 (0.09)* i=6       -0.13 (0.10)* i=8        0.08 (0.06)* i=3        0.26 (0.11)** i=4        0.18 (0.11)** 
 
Manufacture of hollow glass  (GP09-2313) 
 
2313,
om
u
d
tP  2313,or uf tP  leuetP  23,ulab tP   201,atum tP  
1tec   -0.10 (0.03)*** -0.08 (0.03)*** -0.25 (0.09)*** 0.05 (0.07) 0.20 (0.05) 
2313,  udom t iP  i=3         0.27 (0.09)*** i=3       -0.26 (0.09)*** i=6        0.14 (0.09)* i=6         0.40 (0.26)* i=3        0.26 (0.20)* i=4        0.57 (0.22)*** 
i=6       -0.40 (0.21)** 
i=7        -0.44 (0.21)**  
i=6        -0.24 (0.15)* 
2313,  ufor t iP  i=3        -0.12 (0.09)* i=5        -0.17 (0.09)** 
i=7        -0.29 (0.09)*** 
i=8        -0.13 (0.09)* 
 i=1        -0.32 (0.24)* 
i=2        -0.34 (0.25)* 
i=3        -0.37 (0.25)* 
i=7        -0.34 (0.23)* 
i=1         0.37 (0.20)** i=2         0.34 (0.15)** 
i=7         0.18 (0.13)* 
i=8         0.21 (0.14)* 
 euelt iP   i=8        -0.05 (0.03)** i=1        0.22 (0.09)*** i=3        0.14 (0.09)** i=1        -0.14 (0.07)** i=2          0.13 (0.07)** 
i=6         -0.15 (0.08)** 
i=1         0.09 (0.05)** 
23,  lab t iuP  i=1        -0.13 (0.05)** i=2        -0.10 (0.06)* 
i=7         0.13 (0.05)*** 
i=3        -0.13 (0.06)** 
i=4        -0.09 (0.05)** 
i=6         0.08 (0.05)* 
i=8         0.10 (0.04)** 
i=1        -0.19 (0.14)* i=1       -0.61 (0.11)*** 
i=2         0.28 (0.13)** 
i=5         0.28 (0.12)** 
i=3         0.16 (0.09)* 
i=5         0.17 (0.09)** 
201,  umat t iP  i=8        -0.10 (0.06)* i=4         0.12 (0.07)** i=5        -0.11 (0.07)* 
i=7        -0.10 (0.06)* 
  i=1         0.58 (0.08)*** 
i=3         0.26 (0.11)** 
i=7         0.23 (0.11)** 
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Table 9d.: Short-run relationship between output and input prices (GP 2314 – 235) 
Manufacture of fertilizers & nitrogen compounds (GP09-2314) 
 
2314,
om
u
d
tP  2314,or uf tP  leuetP  23,ulab tP   201,atum tP  
     1tec   
-0.44 (0.09)*** -0.03 (0.13) -0.17 (0.20) 0.30 (0.17)* 0.31 (0.12)*** 
2314,u
dom
t iP   i=1      -0.17 (0.09)** i=3       0.13 (0.08)* 
i=6      -0.13 (0.07)**     
i=1       0.20 (0.14)* 
i=3       0.33 (0.12)*** 
i=5       0.20 (0.12)**   
      i=1        -0.28 (0.18)* i=1        -0.27 (0.13)** 
i=5        -0.14 (0.11)* 
2314,u
for
t iP   i=4      -0.12 (0.06)** i=6      -0.13 (0.06)**    i=3      -0.17 (0.10)*    i=5      -0.16  (0.09)** i=3      -0.21 (0.16)* i=6        0.30 (0.14)**    i=1         0.36 (0.14)*** i=2         0.24 (0.13)** i=5         0.15 (0.09)** 
el
u
e
t iP   i=1      -0.07 (0.03)** i=4        0.10 (0.04)***      I=1       -0.08 (0.05)*   i=1        0.23 (0.08)*** i=3        0.18  (0.08)** i=2         0.14 (0.07)** i=6        -0.10 (0.07)* i=1         0.08  (0.05)** i=5        -0.08 (0.05)* 
23,
lab
tu iP   i=4        0.16 (0.06)*** i=5        0.14 (0.05)*** 
i=6        0.11 (0.05)** 
i=1        -0.15 (0.07)** 
i=4         0.12 (0.09)* 
i=5         0.12 (0.08)* 
i=6         0.19 (0.07)*** 
 i=1       -0.53 (0.10)*** 
i=2        -0.24 (0.11)** 
i=5         0.15 (0.11)* 
 
201,u
mat
t iP   i=3       -0.19 (0.08)*** I=2         0.28 (0.12)**  i=1         0.17 (0.12)* i=6         0.21 (0.13)* i=1         0.63 (0.09)*** i=3         0.24 (0.11)** 
 
Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl. (GP09-2319) 
 
2319,
om
u
d
tP  2319,or uf tP  leuetP  23,ulab tP   201,atum tP  
    1tec   
-0.03 (0.02)** -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.11 (0.05)** -0.00 (0.04) 0.05 (0.02)*** 
2319,u
dom
t iP   i=4      -0.12 (0.09)* i=5       0.23 (0.09)** 
i=6       0.22 (0.09)*** 
I=1        0.12 (0.09)* i=4       -0.49 (0.30)** i=4        0.40 (0.21)** 
i=5        0.35 (0.22)* 
i=3        0.23 (015)* 
i=4       -0.24 (0.15)** 
i=6       -0.39 (0.16)***  
2319,u
for
t iP   i=2      -0.12 (0.09)* i=5      -0.21 (0.10)** 
i=6       0.14 (0.10)*   
i=2       -0.13 (0.09)* 
i=2       -0.16 (0.10)** 
i=2       -0.71 (0.31)** 
 
i=3        0.52 (0.24)** i=2        0.43 (0.15)*** 
i=3       -0.33 (0.16)** 
i=4        0.40 (0.16)*** 
i=5        0.36 (0.17)**  
el
u
e
t iP   i=3      -0.07 (0.03)** i=6       -0.05 (0.03)* i=1       -0.07 (0.03)*** i=3       -0.07 (0.03)***  
i=6       -0.04 (0.03)* 
i=1        0.19 (0.09)** 
 
i=2        0.12 (0.07)* 
 
i=1        0.06 (0.05)* 
i=6        0.07 (0.05)* 
23,
lab
tu iP   i=4      -0.08 (0.05)**         i=1       -0.33 (0.14)*** i=2       -0.25 (0.16)* i=1       -0.51 (0.10)*** i=2       -0.23 (0.11)*** 
i=5        0.19 (0.11)** 
i=3        0.10 (0.08)* 
i=5        0.10 (0.07)* 
201,u
mat
t iP   i=3      -0.10 (0.06)*    i=1        0.69 (0.09)*** i=3        0.24 (0.10)** 
i=4       -0.18 (0.10)**  
 
Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster (GP09-235) 
 
235,
om
u
d
tP  235,oruf tP  leuetP  23,ulab tP   20,umattP  
     1tec   
-0.19 (0.05)*** 0.14 (0.08)** -0.09 (0.14) -0.08 (0.11) 0.10 (0.05)** 
235,u
dom
t iP   i=1        0.17 (0.09)** i=2        0.25 (0.09)*** 
i=3        0.18 (0.09)** 
i=4        0.15 (0.09)** 
i=1      -0.21 (0.14)* 
i=2       0.22 (0.14)*  
i=4       0.25 (0.13)** 
i=4        0.33 (0.24)* i=1        0.35 (0.21)** i=3        -0.12 (0.09)*        
235,u
for
t iP   i=1        0.13 (0.05)*** i=3        0.14 (0.05)*** 
i=4       -0.14 (0.05)*** 
i=5        0.07 (0.05)* 
i=1       0.53 (0.07)*** 
i=2      -0.34 (0.08)*** 
i=3       0.28 (0.08)*** 
i=4      -0.20 (0.08)*** 
i=5       0.11 (0.07)* 
i=3       -0.20 (0.14)*  i=1       -0.14 (0.10)*  i=2         -0.07 (0.05)* 
i=4         -0.10 (0.05)**  
el
u
e
t iP   i=3       -0.11 (0.03)***  i=1        0.21 (0.08)*** i=3        0.20 (0.09)** i=1       -0.12 (0.07)**  
23,
lab
tu iP      i=1       -0.52 (0.11)*** i=2       -0.32 (0.12)*** 
i=5        0.13 (0.10)* 
i=5           0.06 (0.04)*       
20,
mat
tu iP    i=1        0.25 (0.16)*  i=1        0.40 (0.20)** i=4       -0.36 (0.23)* i=1          0.52 (0.09)*** i=3          0.31 (0.10)*** 
Note: 1tec   is an error correction term. We report significant coefficients only. Numbers in parenthesis are 
standard error of the estimated parameters. *** (**, *) denotes significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Optimal 
lag length was set as indicated in Table 8a.-c., respectively. 
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Table 10: Diagnostic tests for sectoral VEC models 
 
 
Note: The table reports test statistics and probability values for rejecting the null hypothesis of the following tests: Lagrange Multiplier (LM) autocorrelation test up to the 3rd, 6th 
and 12th lag (H0: no serial correlation at lag order h); Jarque-Bera normality test (orthogonalisation: Cholesky (Lutkepohl), H0: residuals are multivariate normal); White 
heteroskedasticity test without cross terms (WHn) (H0: residuals are homoskedastic).  
  
Sectoral VEC model Autocorrelation Normality Heterosc. 
  LM (3) LM (6) LM (9) LM (12) Skewness Kurtosis JB WHn 
1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard 18.53 [0.82] 15.44 [0.93] 20.39 [0.72] 26.36 [0.55] 12.77 [0.03] 12.09 [0.03] 24.87 [0.01] 1096 [0.00] 
1722 Manufacture of household and toilet paper & paper products 31.32 [0.17] 18.01 [0.84] 21.23 [0.68] 26.65 [0.37] 8.81 [0.12] 43.04 [0.00] 51.85 [0.00] 1327 [0.09] 
2012 Manufacture of dyes and pigments 23.84 [0.53] 22.83 [0.59] 18.51 [0.82] 48.97 [0.00] 3.93 [0.56] 16.40 [0.01] 20.33 [0.03] 719 [0.12] 
2013 Manufacture of other basic inorganic chemicals 35.13 [0.09] 15.84 [0.92] 35.12 [0.09] 45.16 [0.01] 2.93 [0.71] 13.42 [0.02] 16.36 [0.09] 878 [0.10] 
2015 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 17.34 [0.87] 18.48 [0.82] 22.99 [0.58] 37.01 [0.06] 8.47 [0.13] 16.23 [0.01] 24.70 [0.01] 1175 [0.15] 
2016 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 14.18 [0.96] 17.95 [0.84] 13.14 [0.97] 28.33 [0.29] 10.85 [0.05] 20.06 [0.00] 30.91 [0.00] 1043 [0.03] 
2042 Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations 24.17 [0.51] 8.88 [0.99] 19.31 [0.78] 26.47 [0.38] 8.89 [0.11] 13.95 [0.02] 22.84 [0.01] 1156 [0.36] 
2219 Manufacture of other rubber products 45.03 [0.01] 16.29 [0.91] 21.59 [0.66] 35.34 [0.08] 4.28 [0.51] 51.27 [0.00] 55.55 [0.00] 1702 [0.55] 
2313 Manufacture of hollow glass 31.25 [0.18] 13.81 [0.96] 34.20 [0.10] 38.05 [0.05] 11.44 [0.04] 43.60 [0.00] 55.04 [0.00] 1389 [0.75] 
2314 Manufacture of glass fibres 13.23 [0.97] 19.52 [0.77] 17.40 [0.87] 28.27 [0.30] 10.49 [0.06] 11.93 [0.04] 22.42 [0.01] 1178 [0.21] 
2319 Manufacture of other glass, processed, incl. technical glassware 14.64 [0.95] 19.38 [0.78] 14.84 [0.95] 26.86 [0.36] 35.37 [0.00] 172.1 [0.00] 207.5 [0.00] 1154 [0.17] 
235 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 30.11 [0.22] 15.53 [0.93] 19.84 [0.76] 24.04 [0.52] 8.37 [0.14] 9.14 [0.10] 17.51 [0.07] 1044 [0.07] 
